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Wage inequalityUsing longitudinal data from the Dutch Labor Force Supply Panel (OSA), this article exam-
ines how unemployment scarring (i.e., wage setbacks following unemployment) and its
underlying mechanisms operate across gender in the Netherlands over the period 1985–
2000. A series of ﬁxed effect panel models that correct for unobserved heterogeneity, reveal
a notable disparity in unemployment scarring by gender. Interestingly, while unemploy-
ment scarring is short-lived and partly conditional upon human capital differences among
women, it is strongly persistent among men and contingent upon old age, ethnicity, and
tight economic conditions. Our ﬁndings provide new evidence regarding unemployment
scarring by gender while they support the hypothesis that among women the effects of
unemployment scarring are predominantly driven by human capital depreciation, while
among men stigma effects dominate.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The link between unemployment and subsequent economic disadvantage has been at the heart of public and academic
debates over more than three decades. Early unemployment has been found detrimental for workers’ future employment
opportunities because it reduces the future likelihood to be hired, and inﬂicts a setback in re-employment wages that per-
petuates long after the initial unemployment occurrence (Arulampalam, 2001; DiPrete, 1981; DiPrete and McManus, 2000;
Gangl, 2004, 2006; Gregg, 2001; Jacobson et al., 1993; Kuhn, 2002; Moore, 2010; Ruhm, 1991). This wage setback is referred
to in the literature as ‘unemployment scarring’.
While unemployment has been increasingly recognized as a disruptive event that may become the onset of adverse wage
trajectories and inequalities in the labor market, surprisingly little is known about how unemployment processes operate
across gender. The singular focus of previous studies on the scarring effects amongmen, hasmostly led to the omissionofwom-
en from these analyses. As we already know, changes in the employment structure – as result of skilled-biased technological
change and globalization – have inﬂuenced employment opportunities and dynamics among both men and women since the
1980s (Autor, 2010; Buchmann and DiPrete, 2006; Farber, 2011). To the extent that these changes have inﬂuenced dispropor-
tionally the risk of unemployment among disadvantaged groups (such as women or older workers), unemployment is no
longer a disruptive event in the employment careers of men, but has become a lived experience in the lives of many women.
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scarce about how the size and strength of unemployment scarring amongwomen compares to that of men. Consequently, the
question of whether and how unemployment scarring varies by gender still remains not yet fully assessed.
In addition, relatively little attention has been devoted to understanding the conditions under which unemployment scar-
ring operates across gender. For instance, existing research has offered two key mechanisms underlying the process of unem-
ployment scarring. A resource-related mechanism that links scarring to workers’ loss or depreciation of skills during periods
of unemployment; and a signaling-related mechanism that links unemployment scarring to the stigma attached to it. These
mechanisms may work out differently amongst men and women because of differences in the accumulation of human capi-
tal and the different gender prejudgments that surround employers’ hiring decisions. Yet, how human capital and signaling
mechanisms reduce or introduce scarring across gender has received little systematic attention. Do these mechanisms gov-
ern the scarring process similarly across gender or is this process contingent upon individual and contextual level variation?
These questions fall within and contribute to the broader sociological debates about the gender wage gap and will be the
core of our study, which adds two major contributions. First, we advance theory on this topic by investigating the hetero-
geneous effects of unemployment scarring across men and women of different social groups and in different economic con-
ditions. Similar to Omori (1997), we argue that if stigma drives unemployment scarring, then scarring effects should
exacerbate in speciﬁc (tight) labor market situations and among speciﬁc (disadvantaged) groups (e.g., gender, age, parent-
hood, and ethnicity). By contrast, little or no contextual variation would indicate that human capital depreciation effects
dominate. This distinction helps us understand the gendered disparity in unemployment scarring.
Second, we extend existing research by including multiple dimensions of unemployment – previous unemployment
occurrence, repetition and duration – to investigate how each inﬂuences men’s and women’s re-employment wages. In doing
so, our study provides a more nuanced view about the effects of unemployment and extends research that has mainly
focused on singular dimensions of unemployment. We also assess the full magnitude of unemployment scarring, by combin-
ing the various unemployment dimensions into a single ‘unemployment index’. This approach provides a comprehensive and
statistically powerful measure of the unemployment scarring effects, which is new in existing research.
We test our hypotheses about unemployment scarring by gender among a sample of workingmen and women in the
Netherlands over a twenty-year period (1980–2000). The Dutch case is interesting because of its unique labor market struc-
ture (with a high share of women working in part-time jobs), high employment protection, and the prevailing work culture
that adds contrasting evidence and additional insights on the processes underlying unemployment scarring by gender. Our
analyses rely on a rich and comprehensive longitudinal dataset, the Netherlands Labor Supply Panel (OSA) spanning over the
period 1980–2000 with a biennial panel design. The analytical strategy in our study is to apply the samemodel to a sample of
workers who differ only with respect to their route into employment: one group came into employment via a spell of unem-
ployment and the other group via employment. We use ﬁxed-effects panel models that correct for time-constant unobserved
heterogeneity to analyze the effects of unemployment and to disentangle human capital depreciation from stigma effects on
men’s and women’s re-employment wages.2. Theoretical background and expectations
Evidence in different countries has shown that unemployment leaves signiﬁcant scars in the re-employment wages of the
previously unemployed such that wage setbacks remain largely persistent after the initial unemployment instance (Gangl,
2004, 2006; Gregg and Tominey, 2004; Ruhm, 1991). Several theories are used to explain these group differences in wages,
two of which are the most prominent and will guide us through the development of our hypotheses.2.1. Human capital depreciation and unemployment scarring
The ﬁrst ‘‘resource-speciﬁc’’ explanation, originating from the human capital theory (Becker, 1964, 1993), emphasizes
that wage losses following an unemployment spell reﬂect the process of human capital depreciation and skill relocation.
Theory suggests that human capital can be divided into a generic part, which is acquired through education and is transfer-
able across employers, and a speciﬁc part, which is acquired through acquisition of job-speciﬁc human capital through expe-
rience in a speciﬁc ﬁrm or sector and is non-transferable across employers (Becker, 1993). For both men and women, a direct
implication of this distinction is the expectation that interruption of job speciﬁc training may lead to lower levels of produc-
tivity, both instantaneously and in the long run. In particular, skills related to speciﬁc occupations, ﬁrms, or industries are
lost when unemployment occurs. By contrast, generic human capital depreciates over longer spells of unemployment.
Existing studies show that the velocity with which human capital depreciates depends on the duration, repetition, and
recency of unemployment spells. For instance, a single occurrence of unemployment leaves a signiﬁcant scar on re-employment
wages (Jacobson et al., 1993), which becomes larger with more frequent (Stevens, 1997) and longer unemployment
spells (Gangl, 2004; Gregory and Jukes, 2001). While this process is evident across gender, literature suggests two major
factors that lead to a diverging human capital depreciation among previously unemployed men and women. First, given
the erratic nature of women’s labor market trajectories in the Netherlands, which include more frequent interruptions
due to periods of childbearing and caring, women – more than men – accumulate a reduced amount of work experience
(Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002; Gangl and Zieﬂe, 2009). Above and beyond the child-related job interruptions, women
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fact that longer and more frequent spells of unemployment increase the risk of switching into jobs that are located in other
industries or sectors than those predating unemployment. From existing studies, we know that women have higher risks of
settling for jobs in other sectors or taking up lower positioned jobs after a job interruption compared to men (Aisenbrey et al.,
2009; Engelbrech, 1997). We also know that effects of unemployment scarring are short-lived with re-employment in
occupations, sectors or industries that are similar to that before unemployment (DiPrete, 1981) and long-lasting when
re-employment is located in jobs outside of the worker’s discipline or sector (Kuhn, 2002; Mühleisen and Zimmermann,
1994; Stewart, 2007). These ﬁndings suggest that human capital depreciation effects should be more prominent among
previously unemployed women than men. If this holds, unemployment scarring that arises due to human capital depreciation
or from sector or industry relocations should largely diminish among women after we control for such differences. Following
these considerations we expect that:
Hypothesis 1. Unemployment occurrence, duration, and repetition, alone or in combination, will impose a negative effect on
re-employment wages; effects which should be higher among women than men.2.2. Stigma and unemployment scarring
A second ‘‘stigma-related’’ explanation, originating from the signaling theory (Spence, 1973), suggests that group differ-
ences in wages arise from the information asymmetry surrounding the hiring process. Signaling models posit that employ-
ers’ hiring decisions are taken against a background of uncertainty about a worker’s productive capabilities. Whenever such
uncertainty exists, employers rely on the observable characteristics of the worker such as age, ethnicity, and family situation,
but also on their past employment history, all of which serve as a statistical screening device in the hiring process
(Lockwood, 1991; Eliason, 1995). Unemployment stigma may be invoked by gender when unemployed men and women
are treated differently in the hiring process. In the context of our study, unemployment stigma reﬂects employers’ culturally
produced notions about which gender is more likely to experience a certain type of job interruption (i.e., periods of child
rearing or unemployment). We anticipate that the expansion of the Dutch labor market with most women working part-
time jobs has changed employers’ expectations toward working men and women. Speciﬁcally, while women are more often
expected to take up a part-time job and to experience more fragmented careers (due to childrearing), men are expected to
have a full-time and continuous employment career (Mills and Täht, 2010). This implies that deviating from these culturally
deﬁned pathways would carry more of a stigma for men than for women. Departing from the ﬁndings of prior research, stig-
ma effects are likely to exacerbate when combined with characteristics that activate certain stereotypes. In what follows,
each of these characteristics will be described in more detail.
2.2.1. Variations of unemployment stigma across age, parenthood, ethnicity and business cycles
To reveal gendered prejudgments in the hiring process, we examine unemployment scarring as it intersects with a series
of individual and economic characteristics. That is, if scarring arises through stigma then scarring effects on re-employment
wages should vary contingent upon speciﬁc (disadvantaged) group characteristics or economic conditions that reinforce
employers’ pre-existing unemployment stereotypes and inﬂuence their hiring decisions. If these negative effects are gen-
dered, then one would expect to see different patterns of wage setbacks among men and women within a speciﬁc context;
setbacks that move above and beyond the re-employment wage loss due to foregone skills and experience. In what follows
we will delve into existing research and focus on individual and economic characteristics that may activate certain stereo-
types and inﬂuence ﬁrms’ hiring decisions.
We start with age as a potential stigmatizing characteristic. Existing studies ﬁnd that workers who experience unemploy-
ment at older ages (>50 years) suffer more severe wage setbacks from unemployment scarring compared to their younger
counterparts (Arulampalam, 2001; Evangelist and Chrisman, 2013; Gregg, 2001; Stevens, 1997; Manzoni and Mooi-Reci,
2011). An explanation for this relates to the reluctance of employers to hire older workers because they attribute periods
of unemployment to one’s failure, and when they do hire, it comes at the cost of lower wages (Wolbers, 2008). Another
explanation is that older workers who are trained for more traditional occupations are more likely to be hired in jobs that
do not require periods of retraining on-the-job and thereby pay less (Kuhn, 2002). In particular, with shorter periods of
retraining in mind, employers are more likely to hire younger workers because they have acquired skills that are more adapt-
able for newly created jobs. Stigmatizing arguments surrounding employers’ hiring decisions are less prominent among men
who experience unemployment at younger ages (below the age of 25). This is because employers expect a ‘job shopping’
behavior in the initial stages of young men’s careers (Arulampalam, 2001; Kuhn, 2002). Likewise, we expect that culturally
driven expectations about women’s standard employment trajectories will weaken the stigma during ages of childbearing
and rearing. For instance, it is well established that Dutch women increasingly participate the labor market after obtaining
their education degree, then move (brieﬂy) out of the labor market during periods of child-bearing and rearing to return back
to employment after their children reach the age to attend the school (OECD, 2012; Mills and Täht, 2010). As fragmentation
of women’s careers is more common around the ages of 30 and 35, unemployment spells during these ages will be less of a
negative signal and thereby inﬂuence employers’ hiring decision and subsequent wages less negatively. This in contrast to
men who would be more penalized for deviating from ‘the’ standard employment trajectory. Overall we expect that:
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younger counterparts; effects which should be higher among older men than similar older women.
Another potential stigmatizing characteristic is one’s parenthood status. Existing research conﬁrms that employers’ hiring
decisions are strongly inﬂuenced by one’s parenthood status (Budig and England, 2001; Budig and Hodges, 2010; Correll
et al., 2007; England, 2005; Gangl and Zieﬂe, 2009). The literature suggests that employers discriminate against working
mothers in terms of hiring decisions, promotion opportunities, and wages, but not against fathers. According to Correll
et al. (2007), employer discrimination relates to the cultural understanding of the motherhood role. Especially in societies
in which women are expected to take care of their children, employers – unconsciously – prejudge working mothers as less
productive and less competent (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004). It is especially this cultural expectation that leads to dis-
crimination against mothers in hiring, promotion, and wage decisions. By contrast, ‘good’ fathers are expected to work hard
and are seen as more committed to their work. Fathers therefore generally experience an advantage over men without chil-
dren. A recent study by Budig and Hodges (2010) reveals that in the United States the motherhood wage penalties vary in
regards to the age(s) of the woman’s children. Speciﬁcally, the study ﬁnds that the older the children, the higher the hourly
wage penalty experienced by the mother, because of foregone human capital accumulation. The motherhood wage penalty is
also highly present in the Netherlands where the penalty reaches almost 20 percent and is among the highest in Western
societies (Misra et al., 2007). In this study, we extend this evidence by asking whether the combination of being unemployed
and a mother exacerbates existing gender inequalities even further. We argue that mothers who experience unemployment,
may be doubly stigmatized by employers for not only being a ‘bad’ but also a potentially ‘unproductive’ worker. Given the
arguments above, this would not hold for fathers. In sum, we expect that:
Hypothesis 2b. Previously unemployed mothers will experience stronger wage penalties compared to previously
unemployed fathers.
A worker’s ethnicity is another characteristic that may negatively inﬂuence employers’ hiring and wage decisions. It is
well established that hiring decisions are governed by stereotypes, which enable employers to organize, rank, and interpret
the amount of data provided by job applications (Fiske, 1998; Moreno and Bodenhausen, 1999). Especially when employers
have little information about the productivity of an applicant from a speciﬁc ethnic group they are more likely to dis-
criminate on statistical grounds. For instance, the ambiguity regarding the recognition of the educational achievements or
titles that are speciﬁc to certain occupations generate difﬁculties when it comes to evaluating working skills of non-natives
in the hiring process (Chiswick, 1991). In addition, language deﬁciencies in speaking and writing ﬂuency may raise doubts
about the ability of non-native workers to perform in high-skilled jobs (Chiswick, 1991; Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003). Native
workers who are more ﬂuent of the host country language will be able to better communicate and promote their qualiﬁca-
tions and skills (Dustmann, 1994). These ambiguities may translate into discriminatory practices and thereby lead to wage
differentials between native and non-native workers.
Wage differentials based on one’s ethnicity may exacerbate with periods of unemployment. For instance, the occurrence,
duration and frequency of unemployment altogether, may conﬁrm an employer’s pre-existing doubts about the performance
and/or future productivity of an immigrant worker. These stereotypes do not necessarily lead to the exclusion of previously
unemployed immigrant workers from the labor market, rather they are used by the employers to justify the concentration of
immigrant workers into lower positioned jobs that are less demanding and thereby pay less (Browne and Kennelly, 1999;
Moore, 2010). According to theories of social closure (Blumer, 1965; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993) employer’s stereotypes are
based on the normative ideas that they share about the economic and social position of the group in which they belong.
For instance, employers who belong to a group with higher economic and social position (i.e., the native group), will develop
more negative expectations about the productivity of an immigrant worker who originates from a group with lower socio-
economic conditions and more common unemployment spells (i.e., immigrants from poorer countries). This means that the
closer the social distance between people or groups – in color, appearance and socioeconomic background – the more sym-
pathetic people will be at each other (Blumer, 1965; van Tubergen et al., 2004). Likewise, stereotypes that employers have
about immigrants may differ across gender. Purely based on their appearance, previously unemployed immigrant male
workers from poorer countries are more likely to be labeled as unreliable or unproductive. These inaccurate perceptions
by employers can lead to poor job matches, lower productivity and eventually lower wages among previously unemployed
male immigrants. Conversely, immigrant women from same poorer countries are more likely to be perceived as nurturing,
considerate and more ‘obedient’ to a ﬁrm’s rules (England, 1992; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993). As employers perceive these
traits as less of a threat, they should be less penalizing in terms of re-employment wages relative to their male immigrant
counterparts.
To put this in perspective, in the Netherlands the composition of the immigrants has been dominated by four immigrant
groups originating from: Suriname, Turkey, Morocco and the Dutch Antilles. In the 1980s these groups represented about 79
percent of the non-western foreign-born population in the Netherlands while this percentage dropped to about 44 percent in
the 1990s (CBS, Statline 20131). Different from immigrants from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles that shared a colonial history
with the Dutch, workers from Morocco and Turkey were attracted to ﬁll the labor shortages in the manufacturing and services
sector. Speciﬁcally, male workers from Morocco and Turkey were mainly engaged in low-skilled jobs that were concentrated in1 http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=70787ned&D1=a&D2=0&D3=0&D4=a&D5=0,8,18,28,l&HDR=T,G4&STB=G1,G2,G3&VW=T.
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abovementioned arguments we expect that:
Hypothesis 2c. Previously unemployed non-native workers will suffer stronger wage penalties than native workers; this
effect should be higher among men than among equivalent women.
Stigma effects from unemployment will vary with the business cycle. In times of economic downturn, with high unem-
ployment rates and few open vacancies, the probability of ﬁnding a job decreases. Following arguments from the economic
literature, a spell of unemployment incurred during a recession is less of a negative signal to employers than one experienced
during an economic upturn (Blanchard and Diamond, 1994; Lockwood, 1991; Omori, 1997). The idea is that when screening
job applications, employers will attribute the occurrence of unemployment to ﬁrm closures and reorganizations that take
place during economic downturns. Consequently, if stigma effects exist, unemployment scarring should be higher when
unemployment is encountered during periods with lower unemployment rates than in periods with higher unemployment
rates. Following these arguments we posit that:
Hypothesis 2d. Previously unemployed workers will suffer stronger wage penalties when their unemployment occurs
during economic upturns compared to those otherwise.3. Data, measures and method
3.1. Data
The data for our study come from the Netherlands Labor Supply Panel (OSA). The OSA panel is the longest and oldest
household panel in the Netherlands (Allaart et al., 1987; NIWI, 2000; Abbring et al., 2002) and is comparable to other
European speciﬁc household panels such as the British Household Panel (BHPS) in the UK or the German Socioeconomic
Panel (GSOEP) in Germany. The panel study is continually refreshed and is targeted at a representative sample of 4000–
5000 respondents in each wave. The ﬁrst wave was interviewed in 1985 (with a retrospective component reaching back
to 1980) and then re-approached in 1986 with further biennial waves until 2000. Panel attrition over the nine waves (around
39%) was compensated by adding fresh respondents using a sampling design that was stratiﬁed by region, gender, age, and
education (NIWI, 2000). The data is unique such that it includes a wealth of information about respondent’s family back-
ground, education, and incomes. In particular, at each wave, the current earnings situation of the respondent was reported.
The respondents in our analyses were between 20 and 54 years of age, employed at the moment of interview, and have a
valid wage observation at the time of interview. We excluded wage observations in the bottom 1st percentile (N = 235),
which are likely to be produced by measurement problems and can be inﬂuential. Finally, we excluded wage observations
from those who became unemployed due to seasonal employment (N = 424) as their job loss contradicts the deﬁnition of
unemployment as an involuntary event resulting from exogenously determined ﬁrm decisions.
Given these requirements, we start with a sample containing 20,925 wage observations over 9,490 workers between 20
and 54 years old. In order to apply ﬁxed-effects modeling (which we will explain in the next section in more detail) we need
at least two wage observations per worker. This means that workers with less than two wage observations are dropped from
our analyses leaving us with an effective sample of 10,897 valid wage observations over 4815 workers, which is an average of
2.3 wage observations for each individual worker. In Table 1A of Appendix A, we cross tabulate workers’ consecutive wage
observations by the interview years, across workers of 20 and 54 years of age who reported at least one wage observation.
Here, the cells in the diagonal indicate the maximum number of consecutive wage observations, while the rows depict the
distribution of wage observations across the different interview years. For instance, the ﬁrst cell on the diagonal shows the
number of wage observations (N = 1097) that respondents between the ages of 20 and 54 years reported in two consecutive
years (that is, 1985 and 1986). Thus, cases with only one wage observation in either year are excluded from this table. Next,
in column 1988, we count 604 wage observations that are reported in two consecutive years, and 658 wage observations
(out of the 1097 initial cases) that are reported in three consecutive years (that is, 1985, 1986 and 1988). The number of
consecutive wage observations drops with the elapsed time in the panel (with 46 consecutive wage observations across
the 9 waves). This comes due to attrition that appears in studies that span over relatively longer periods and is common
to longitudinal types of data. Next, in Table 1B of Appendix A, we examine whether the trend of unemployment in the
OSA panel coincides with the more general, national trend of unemployment in the Netherlands over the years 1985–
2000. Descriptive statistics reveal no systematic bias herein such that the share of the unemployed between 20 and 54 years
of age in the OSA panel compares to the actual distribution of the same group of unemployed over the years 1985–2000 in
the Netherlands.
To identify unemployment episodes in our data we have followed a two-step approach. First, we have used each respon-
dent’s reported labor force status at the date of interview, distinguishing between (1) employed, (2) self-employed, (3)
unemployed, (4) non-participating, (5) in military service, and (6) in education. Unemployment is explicitly deﬁned in the
questionnaire as ‘‘currently out of labor and searching actively for a job’’. Other forms of non-participation (e.g., maternity
leave, homeworker) are explicitly excluded, both in the questionnaire formulation and in our design. In addition, we used
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Second, the OSA survey asks respondents to report the start and end dates of any change in labor force status that occurred
between the current and last interview date. This retrospective information enables us to record all unemployment spells
that occurred between two interview dates.3.2. Measures
3.2.1. Dependent variable
In this study, the dependent variable is workers’ re-employment wage that is deﬁned as the log of net2 hourly wages at time
t for individual i, excluding overtime pay and overtime hours. This variable is constructed by dividing the monthly net wages3
by the hours of work. Before taking the natural logarithm over the hourly re-employment wages, we harmonized the units of
measurement by dividing hourly wages by the mean of hourly wages in each particular wave.3.2.2. Unemployment indicators
To test the expectations about the scarring effects of unemployment, we have constructed four indicators for unemploy-
ment, each of which has been empirically and theoretically shown to negatively inﬂuence workers re-employment wages.
First, unemployment occurrence measured by constructing a lagged binary unemployment variable, which takes the value
of 1 if the worker was unemployed in the previous wave and 0 if (s)he was continuously employed. Second, unemployment
duration in years refers to the most recent unemployment spell and is measured by taking the difference between the start
and end period of the most recent unemployment spell. Unemployment spells that are experienced before the observation
period are not included in this measure, however, which is a drawback of the unbalanced character of our panel. According to
our data, previously unemployed women experience on average slightly longer unemployment spells compared to previous-
ly unemployed men, with respectively 17.37 and 15.07 months. Third, unemployment repetition is measured by counting the
number of unemployment episodes over the entire observation period. The variable distinguishes between three categories
(1 = 2 previous unemployment spells; 2 = 3 previous unemployment spells; 3 = 4+ previous unemployment spells), with
those in continuous employment as the reference category. Fourth, we have constructed a time-varying indicator for the ﬁrst
unemployment, which takes the value of 1 if a worker’s unemployment spell in the previous wave was his or her ﬁrst unem-
ployment and 0 if a worker remained in continuous employment. We expect all these unemployment indicators to relate
negatively to re-employment wages.
It is known that unemployment may reﬂect the quality of a worker’s performance in the previous job, which in turn
inﬂuences the level of wages upon re-employment (Moore, 2010). Similar to Moore (2010) we minimize the threat of group
differences in the quality of workers’ performance, which in turn inﬂuences re-employment wages by controlling for the
reasons of unemployment. We do so by including a dummy variable for unemployed due to ﬁrm closings (1 = yes; and
0 = otherwise) and the dummy for unemployed for own motivations (1 = yes; and 0 = otherwise). These variables were
derived from respondents’ reported reasons for labor force change that occurred either between or at the time of the
interview.
Additionally, to capture the combined effects of these unemployment indicators, we have also constructed an ‘unem-
ployment index’. To do so, we have ﬁrst standardized the individual unemployment indicators (e.g., unemployment occur-
rence, unemployment duration, unemployment repetition and ﬁrst unemployment) to have a mean of 0 and a variance of
1 (for men and women combined). We then averaged the four standardized unemployment indicators into a single sum-
mative4 index, with the assumption that each of the standardized indicators contributes equally to the index. This index indi-
cates the extent to which one has been unemployed. For the ease of interpretation, we rescale the index into a 0.1 variable
such that 0 pertains to those in the reference base who have been in continuous employment and 1 refers to those with the
highest extent of unemployment. The index measures changes in relation to this base. An unemployment index of 0.18, for
example, means one has experienced an 18 percent increase in unemployment compared to those in the base. This is the
average of the standardized indicators for previous unemployment occurrence, its duration, whether it was one’s ﬁrst or
whether there were multiple unemployment occasions. Thus, one’s unemployment index closer to the base (0) indicates
shorter and less frequent unemployment spells in the past, and otherwise. In Fig. 1A of Appendix A, the kernel distribution
of the rescaled unemployment index (only for those who experienced unemployment) is shown for men and women
separately. As expected, Fig. 1A shows that in general women experience more frequent unemployment spells than men.
In particular, there is a large share of women with a relatively low unemployment index suggesting interrupted careers of
shorter spells or single unemployment spells. However, the share of men and women with a high unemployment index is
also evident in our sample.2 Income tax is levied on an individual basis in the Netherlands, meaning that wage effects are unlikely to conﬂate with the scar that arises through changing
household circumstances.
3 Gross wages have not been asked for consistently throughout the different waves in the OSA panel. For this reason we have chosen the net monthly wages
as our primary wage variable for the analyses.
4 The four indicator variables are highly interrelated. Constructing an index allows us to avoid multi-co linearity problems in interaction models. However,
the four indicators all tap independently collected information, and averaging them also redresses random measurement error.
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We capture the process of human capital depreciation in various ways. First, we construct a time-varying measure for
education that captures the generic part of human capital by the highest achieved level of education at the time of interview.
This variable distinguishes between: (1) elementary education [LO]; (2) lower intermediate education [VBO-MAVO]; (3)
higher intermediate secondary education [MBO-HAVO-VWO]; (4) vocational college [HBO] and (5) university degree
[WO]. However, given the small variation in workers’ level of education at the time of interview, we can expect minimal
effects of this variable on the re-employment wages. Second, we construct three distinct variables to capture workers’ loss
of speciﬁc human capital. We include tenure (in years) with the former employer (which is based upon workers’ reported
start and end dates of employment with the previous employer); a time-varying dummy variable – based on the two-digit
occupation codes according to the 1984 Standard Occupation Classiﬁcation (SBC)5 – for whether a respondent moved into the
changed occupation (0 = no; and 1 = otherwise); and a time-varying dummy variable for whether the respondent changed indus-
tries (0 = no; and 1 = otherwise). In doing so, we capture the foregone skills with the previous ﬁrm, occupation and industries all
of which should be negatively correlated with re-employment wages. These three indicators are indirect measures of human
capital depreciation. However, within our data constraints they provide a unique opportunity to measure indirectly worker’s
human capital depreciation. Age in years is included as a proxy for work experience and the variable age squared is included
to examine the curvilinear relationship between the accumulation of work experience and re-employment wages.
3.2.4. Stigma indicators
To test hypotheses 2a to 2d that capture potential stigma effects we introduce four interaction terms that test these
hypotheses respectively. These are between: (a) unemployment index and whether unemployment was experienced at
old age (1 = equal or above 50 years; and 0 = otherwise); (b) unemployment index and whether or not children are present
in the household (0 = no children; and 1 = co-residing children); (c) unemployment index and respondent’s ethnicity
(0 = country of origin, the Netherlands, (i.e., Dutch); and 1 = country of origin outside the Netherlands (i.e., Non-Dutch);
and ﬁnally between; (d) the unemployment index and whether or not unemployment was experienced during tight labor
market conditions (= 1 if unemployment rate at year of unemployment lies above the average unemployment rate over
the period 1985–2000 and 0 if otherwise).
3.2.5. Demographic measures, job characteristics, and macro characteristics
To control for demographic differences, that may inﬂuence the likelihood of unemployment and thereby subsequent
re-employment wages, two measures were constructed. These are: marital status (0 = widowed/divorced; 1 = married/
cohabiting; and 2 = single); number of co-residing children (ranging from 0 to 4+). We also control for various job-related
characteristics that may inﬂuence respondents’ (un)employment history and their re-employment wages (and thus act as
confounding variables). These are the number of working hours (ranging between 12 and 40); type of contract (1 = permanent;
and 0 = temporary contracts); the level of occupational status at the time of interview using the International Socio-Economic
Index (ISEI) scale of Ganzeboom et al. (1992), and sector in which the job at time of interview is located (1 = public; and
0 = private). We expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship between jobs with higher occupational status and permanent
employment contract with re-employment wages (due to ﬁrms’ investments and subsequent promotion opportunities
within the ﬁrm). Given a strong collective bargaining history in the Netherlands together with the high share of union
membership particularly concentrated in the public sector, we expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship between jobs in the
public sector and re-employment wages (due to a better protection of workers’ rights in the work place). Finally, to check
for business cycle variations, we include a variable indicating the annual rate of unemployment separately for men and
women as reported by Statistics Netherlands (2010).6
3.3. Methods
To address scarring in terms of wage penalties, a log-wage linear regression panel model is ﬁtted. We apply a ﬁxed-effects
model, which eliminates biases that occur by the failure to include controls for unmeasured personal characteristics such as
motivation to work or ability to keep a job. In ﬁxed-effects models, comparisons within individuals are conducted by (1)
averaging at least two wage observations and by (2) modeling their deviations from this average. Since the unobserved
heterogeneity in ﬁxed-effects models is assumed to be time constant, any difference with its mean results in 0 and is
dropped from the model. The model yields the following linear speciﬁcation:5 Foll
6 httplnwit ¼ b0xit þ ai þ eit ð1Þ
where ln(wit) is the natural logarithm of hourly wage at time t for individual i. xit refers to a vector of observable variables on
individual characteristics, b0 refers to a transposed vector of coefﬁcients associated with the observable characteristics.
Finally, ai refers to the time-invariant individual speciﬁc errors that capture the unobserved heterogeneity while the eit is
the equation error term. In our study, wage Eq. (1) is extended to the following speciﬁcation:ow the link for more details on the classiﬁcation: http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/methoden/classiﬁcaties/overzicht/sbc/2010/default.htm.
://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/selection/default.aspx?DM=SLNL&PA=80718NED&VW=T.
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where b0 includes a vector of the observable characteristics indicating younger and older workers’ education, tenure with the
previous employer, age, age squared, employed in the same occupation, industry changes, marital status, co-residing chil-
dren, sector, type of contract, weekly working hours, unemployment due to ﬁrm closing, unemployment due to own moti-
vations and unemployment rate. The value of ui,t1 refers to the vector of unemployment dimensions such as unemployment
occurrence, unemployment duration, ﬁrst unemployment, and unemployment repetition (with dummies for 2, 3 and 4 or
more previous unemployment spells), whereas c0 refers to a vector that captures the coefﬁcients associated with each sepa-
rate dimension of unemployment. Please note that in this equation we include dummy variables for unemployment repeti-
tion to assess the distribution of effects across multiple spells. Next, interaction effects are added to the model to examine
our stigma-related hypotheses. The wage Eq. (2) therefore extends to the following speciﬁcation:lnwit ¼ b0xit þ c0ui;t1 þ k0uxi;t1 þ ai þ eit ð3Þ
where uxi,t1 refers to the vector of interactions between the unemployment index and the disadvantageous micro- and
macro-level labor market conditions (i.e., old age, parenthood, ethnicity, and economic downturn) with k0 as the pertinent
vector of interaction terms with the subset of terms pertaining to the disadvantageous micro –and macro conditions. As
mentioned above, our unemployment index averages out four unemployment indicators (e.g., unemployment occurrence,
unemployment duration, ﬁrst unemployment and unemployment repetition). In the index measure, unemployment repeti-
tion is included as a categorical variable.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Testing for human capital effects
A central expectation in our ﬁrst hypothesis was that the indicators of unemployment, alone or in combination, would
entail a negative effect on re-employment wages; an effect that should be higher among women than men. Fig. 1 provides
an initial clue about the wage differences across workers with and without unemployment in their careers. The plotted wage
differentials indicate that unemployed workers (here not stratiﬁed by gender) not only have lower wages compared to their
continuously employed companions, but that these wage differentials grow larger over time.
We next explore whether these results persist once we control for human capital, demographic, as well as job and macro
characteristics. Table 1 presents results from four ﬁxed-effect regression models that test for human capital depreciation
effects. Models 1 and 2 test our ﬁrst hypothesis followed by an additional column (D) which tests for gender speciﬁc differ-
ences by combining the sample of men and women and by estimating a full interaction model between gender and all the
covariates used in Model 1. In Models 3 and 4, we include the unemployment index to measure the combined effect of
unemployment on workers’ re-employment wages. Also here, the last column tests for gender differences within our esti-
mates. We interpret our estimates in terms of percentages by taking the antilog of the estimated coefﬁcients minus 1, name-
ly: (expcoef)  1.
Results from the models provide two key ﬁndings that partially corroborate with the ﬁrst hypothesis. First, we ﬁnd that
the separate indicators of unemployment inﬂuence both men and women negatively, and that their relative importance on
re-employment wages varies across gender. For instance, Model 1 in Table 2 indicates that for women, the ﬁrst unemploy-
ment spell inﬂicts the deepest wage scar with nearly 17 percent (b = 0.156, t = 2.82) relative to women in continuous2
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Fig. 1. Mean of log hourly wages by employment status. Source: Data are from the OSA Supply Panels, 1985–2000, Netherlands.
Table 1
Unstandardized coefﬁcients for the human capital effect on subsequent log of hourly wages, from ﬁxed-effects models by gender, The Netherlands 1980–2000.
Source: Author’s calculations, using data from the OSA Supply Panels, 1985–2000.
Female Male D Female Male D
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment indicators
Unemployment occurrence (t1) 0.073* 0.000 – –
(1.80) (0.02)
Unemployment duration, years (t1) 0.002 0.025** – –
(0.21) (2.47)
First unemployment 0.156*** 0.097*** – –
(2.82) (3.81)
2 previous unemployment spells 0.005 0.047 – –
(0.07) (1.41)
3 previous unemployment spells 0.015 0.035 – –
(0.15) (0.47)
4+ previous unemployment spells 0.114 0.138*** – –
(0.87) (2.82)
(Standardized) Unemployment index – – 0.141* 0.173***
(1.80) (3.02)
Human capital indicators
Education level 0.028 0.007 0.025 0.009
(1.18) (0.66) (1.09) (0.77)
Tenure with previous employer (years) 0.007 0.006*** 0.005 0.007***
(1.22) (2.99) (0.88) (3.17)
Changed occupation (2-digit) 0.030* 0.024** 0.033** 0.021**
(1.82) (2.41) (2.07) (2.15)
Changed industries (1-digit) 0.047 0.055** 0.061 0.050*
(0.97) (1.61) (1.33) (1.83)
Age (years) 0.008 0.033*** 0.007 0.032***
(0.84) (7.28) (0.71) (7.08)
Age squared 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000***
(0.77) (7.09) (0.67) (6.97)
Demographic, job- and macro indicators
Marital status 0.055* 0.028* 0.058* 0.029*
(1.73) (1.72) (1.83) (1.78)
Non-Dutch 0.024 0.018 0.027 0.018
(1.15) (1.60) (1.29) (1.61)
Co-residing children 0.023** 0.007* *** 0.023** 0.008* ***
(2.38) (1.77) (2.33) (1.89)
Working hours 0.014*** 0.019*** *** 0.013*** 0.019*** ***
(15.25) (23.30) (15.09) (23.21)
Sector (= public) 0.012 0.003 0.014 0.005
(0.70) (0.30) (0.82) (0.47)
Type of contract (= permanent) 0.041* 0.013 0.042** 0.015
(1.95) (1.18) (1.97) (1.33)
Occupation level (ISEI codes) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.69) (8.13) (3.66) (8.19)
Unemployed due to ﬁrm closings 0.034 0.011 0.036 0.012
(1.26) (0.96) (1.31) (1.02)
Unemployed due to own motivations 0.066* 0.001 * 0.067* 0.006 *
(1.78) (0.07) (1.81) (0.30)
Unemployment rate at interview date 0.004 0.007*** 0.004 0.007***
(0.96) (3.24) (0.98) (3.34)
Constant 2.473*** 2.613*** 2.486*** 2.629***
(11.12) (26.28) (11.23) (26.57)
Observations 3995 6892 3995 6892
Number of Respondents 1913 2901 1913 2901
R-squared (within) 0.128 0.180 0.124 0.177
Note: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages; – Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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7.5 percent lower wages per hour (b = 0.073, t = 1.80). We ﬁnd no evidence of a growing wage gap with more frequent or
longer spells of unemployment among women. For men we ﬁnd that it is particularly the repetition of unemployment that
causes the highest scarring effects. Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrst unemployment spell produces a wage setback of 10 percent
Table 2
Unstandardized coefﬁcients for the stigma effect of unemployment on subsequent log of hourly wages, from ﬁxed- effects models by gender, The Netherlands
1980–2000. Source: Authors’ calculations, using data from the OSA Supply Panels, 1985–2000.
Female Male
(1) (2)
Main effects
Unemployment index 0.117 0.116
(0.50) (1.03)
UnemployedP50 years 0.048 0.055*
(0.79) (1.76)
Co-residing children 0.035* 0.004
(1.83) (0.42)
Non-Dutch 0.002 0.016
(0.04) (0.48)
High unemployment at year of unemployment 0.020 0.021
(0.58) (0.97)
Interaction (Stigma) indicators
UnemployedP50 years  Unemployment index 0.036 0.219**
(0.21) (2.00)
Co-residing children  Unemployment index 0.139 0.086
(0.93) (0.95)
Non-Dutch  Unemployment index 0.197 0.116*
(1.61) (1.84)
High unemployment  Unemployment index 0.188 0.208**
(1.05) (1.97)
Human capital indicators
Education level 0.017 0.013
(0.77) (1.15)
Tenure with previous employer (years) 0.003 0.008***
(0.65) (3.77)
Changed occupation (2-digit) 0.037** 0.025**
(2.32) (2.54)
Changed industries (1-digit) 0.104* 0.056*
(1.87) (1.78)
Age (years) 0.004 0.034***
(0.47) (7.74)
Age squared 0.000 0.000***
(0.28) (7.35)
Demographic, job, and macro indicators
Marital status 0.061* 0.032*
(1.89) (1.86)
Working hours 0.013*** 0.019***
(14.73) (23.78)
Sector (= public) 0.017 0.004
(1.01) (0.44)
Type of contract (= permanent) 0.046** 0.013
(2.17) (1.12)
Occupation level (ISEI codes) 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.73) (7.79)
Unemployed due to ﬁrm closings 0.035 0.012
(1.28) (0.94)
Unemployed due to own motivations 0.072* 0.002
(1.92) (0.09)
Constant 2.537*** 2.489***
(12.46) (24.85)
Observations 3995 6892
Number 1913 2901
R-Squared 0.123 0.179
Note: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages. All the models control for human capital measures as well as demographic, job, and macro variables.
– Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
I. Mooi-Reci, H.B. Ganzeboom / Social Science Research 52 (2015) 642–658 651(b = 0.097, t = 3.81). This penalty is lower and not signiﬁcant with two (b = 0.047, t = 1.41) and three (b = 0.035, t = 0.47)
previous unemployment spells, but becomes signiﬁcantly larger with four or more spells of previous unemployment
(b = 0.138, t = 2.82). In addition, the length of unemployment also comes with a re-employment wage penalty.
Speciﬁcally, for each additional year in unemployment, men suffer about 2.5 percent (b = 0.025, t = 2.47) lower hourly
re-employment wages relative to men who remain in continuous employment; a penalty that differs also signiﬁcantly
652 I. Mooi-Reci, H.B. Ganzeboom / Social Science Research 52 (2015) 642–658between men and women. In addition, analyses reveal a U-shape pattern in scarring that pertains to the dimension of unem-
ployment repetition.
Second, we ﬁnd that the combined magnitude of unemployment scarring is similar across men and women. Speciﬁcally,
the combined dimensions of unemployment into the (standardized) unemployment index in Model 3 indicate a ‘total’ wage
setback from unemployment of about 15 percent among women (b = 0.141, t = 1.80) and in Model 4 of about 18 percent
among men (b = 0.173, t = 3.02). At this point, our expectation from the ﬁrst hypothesis – that women should experience
higher scarring effects – is not conﬁrmed. The weak effect among women, suggests that the deep wage scar that women
experience after their ﬁrst unemployment spell does not accumulate with longer durations or more frequent repetition of
subsequent unemployment spells. The fact that unemployment scarring among women almost disappears after controlling
for human capital, demographic and job characteristics implies that scarring effects are largely short-lived among women
and more persistent among men.
It is important to note that most of the human capital, demographic, job –and macro indicators in Model 1 thru 4 inﬂu-
ence re-employment wages in the expected direction. As expected, we ﬁnd that (non)transferability of speciﬁc skills inﬂu-
ences signiﬁcantly the level of subsequent wages. For instance, particularly among men, skills tied to the previous employer
produce a wage penalty of about 6 percent for each year of lost tenure (b = 0.006, t = 2.99). However, those who change occu-
pations suffer between 2.5 and 3 percent lower re-employment wages, depending on one’s gender, compared to those who
do otherwise. Speciﬁcally, the magnitude of this effect is slightly higher among women (b = 0.030, t = 1.82) but the sig-
niﬁcance is stronger among men (b = -0.024, t = 2.41). Loss of industry-speciﬁc knowledge also comes with a re-employment
wage penalty but only amongst previously unemployed men (b = -0.055, t = 1.61).
Interestingly, our results reveal a parenthood wage penalty such that women with co-residing children experience a wage
penalty of about 2.3 percent, while men gain about 0.07 percent for each co-residing child. These results are in line with ﬁnd-
ings from earlier studies that ﬁnd profound evidence of a parenthood wage penalty in the United States (Correll et al., 2007;
Budig and Hodges, 2010). Apparently, such penalties are not speciﬁc to the United States but also evident in the Netherlands.
Finally, working hours and the type of contract inﬂuence signiﬁcantly men’s and women’s re-employment wages.
Speciﬁcally, the positive coefﬁcient pertaining to the type of employment contract is likely to reﬂect the gains (due to ﬁrm’s
investment and promotion opportunities) that are related to a stable working career and support earlier empirical evidence
found in the Netherlands (Mooi-Reci and Dekker, 2013). In addition, the reason of unemployment shows a weak and nega-
tive effect particularly on women’s log of hourly wages. Interestingly, although not signiﬁcant, men and women who expe-
rience unemployment due to ﬁrm closings earn relatively higher wages than those who lose their jobs due to own
motivations. These differences may hide potential discriminatory practices when employers make hiring decisions and could
be addressed in more detail in future research.
In sum, both men and women are inﬂuenced negatively by unemployment. However, there is a notable disparity in the
unemployment scarring by gender. While the wage setback following unemployment almost diminishes among women
after controlling for the foregone human capital with regard to changing occupations and temporary employment contracts,
among men the wage gap remains largely unexplained. The stronger effects of unemployment scarring among men suggest
that men are likely inﬂuenced through more channels than women.4.2. Testing for variations in unemployment stigma
Table 2 estimates Eq. (3), which introduces 4 interaction terms to test for stigma effects (stigma hypotheses 2a thru 2d).
The inclusion of the four interaction terms separately for women and men – along with controls for human capital and
demographic differences – allows us to assess any unemployment scarring and gender disparities across speciﬁc groups
and economic contexts.
The major ﬁnding from these models is that effects of unemployment scarring are not universal, but vary upon context,
namely: its effects are more profound (i) at older ages (50 years and older), (ii) during economic downturns and (iii) among
immigrant workers; effects that exist solely among men. To be more speciﬁc, we start with the interpretation of the results in
Model 2 that apply to men. We ﬁnd that, wage penalties exacerbate with 23 percent if men experience unemployment dur-
ing tight economic conditions (b = 0.208, t = 1.97). The exacerbation of wage penalties is almost similar in size and strength
(b = 0.219, t = 2.00) among workers who experience their ﬁrst unemployment at older ages (50 years and older) and some-
what smaller and weaker among immigrant workers (b = 0.116, t = 1.84). Interestingly, for women, all the different inter-
action terms are not signiﬁcant, suggesting that unemployment wage penalties among women are not skewed along lines of
parenthood, age, ethnicity, or labor market conditions. Overall, the systematic contextual variation of unemployment scar-
ring among men reveals a gendered pattern of scarring that, most likely, arises through stigma. Speciﬁcally, employers’ hir-
ing decisions seem to be highly contingent upon age, ethnicity, and economic conditions, but only among men. These results
lend support to our expectation that stigma effects are more prominent among men than women, at least, in the Dutch
context.
Finally, to test whether the panel attrition/selection in a different number of wage observations is at random, we perform
a two-step ordered probit Heckman selection model as suggested by Chiburis and Lokshin (2007).7 The two-step procedure is7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
Table 3
Sensitivity analyses. Source: – Authors’ calculations, using data from the OSA Supply Panels, 1985–2000.
Fixed effects regression Fixed effects combined with ordered Heckman
Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment occurrence (T1) 0.073* 0.000 0.021 0.093
(1.80) (0.02) (0.18) (1.62)
Unemployment duration, years (T1) 0.002 0.025** 0.012 0.037***
(0.21) (2.47) (0.62) (3.09)
First unemployment 0.156*** 0.097*** 0.173*** 0.081***
(2.82) (3.81) (2.94) (2.92)
2 previous unemployment spells 0.005 0.047 0.014 0.065*
(0.07) (1.41) (0.21) (1.95)
3 previous unemployment spells 0.015 0.035 0.001 0.037
(0.15) (0.47) (0.02) (0.50)
4+ previous unemployment spells 0.114 0.138*** 0.080 0.161***
(0.87) (2.82) (0.61) (3.28)
Mills ratio 0.099 0.095*
(0.85) (1.79)
Constant 2.473*** 2.613*** 2.482*** 2.522***
(11.12) (26.28) (12.64) (26.16)
Observations 3995 6892 3995 6898
Number of Respondents 1913 2901 1913 2901
Note: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wages. All the models control for human capital measures as well as demographic, job, and macro variables.
– Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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selecting those having 1+ wage observations versus 0 wage observations, 2+ wage observations versus 1 wage observation, 3+
wage observations versus 2wage observations, etc. up to 6+ wage observations conditional on a series of individual level char-
acteristics. Three instrumental variables were used for the identiﬁcation of the selection equation: the unemployment rate at the
time of the ﬁrst spell of unemployment (i.e., this reﬂects the effect on subsequent labor market participation but does not directly
affect workers’ wages); marital status and whether or not the respondent had co-residing children. These two latter variables are
commonly used in the (economic) literature as instrumental variables (see Chiburis and Lokshin, 2007; Gregory and Jukes,
2001; Arulampalam, 2001). The second step (e.g., the outcome model), includes the series of inverse Mills ratios (the q’s).
Through a Wald test, such an application assesses whether the selection of varying number of observable wage observations
is generated at random. For both women and men in our sample, the Wald test strongly rejects the null hypothesis. This indi-
cates that sample selection is not generated at random. We continued with the estimation of the two-step ordered probit
Heckman selection model using the ordinal selection variable in the ﬁrst step. We then used the estimations from the ﬁrst step
to predict an overallMills ratio in the second step. In a ﬁnal step, we added the predicted Mills ratio as an additional regressor in
our ﬁxed effect estimations. Results are presented in Table 3. Speciﬁcally, Models 1 and 2 display results from those presented
earlier in Table 1, which control for various individual and job characteristics. Models 3 and 4 display results from the ﬁxed
effect regression model that correct for the selectivity of our sample by applying a two-step ordered probit Heckman correction
procedure as proposed by Chiburis and Lokshin (2007).
Results from Table 3 provide interesting information regarding the sensitivity of our estimations. Speciﬁcally, estimates
from the standard ﬁxed effect regression (Models 1 and 2) differ especially with regard to their magnitude from the esti-
mates that follow from the ordered probit Heckman selection procedure (Models 3 and 4). For women, we ﬁnd that the
(weak) effect of unemployment occurrence at the previous wave (t1) disappears while the effect of the ﬁrst unemployment
spell on wages becomes slightly higher (b = 0.173, t = 2.94) in the Heckman Model 3. Among men we ﬁnd that the effects of
unemployment duration, unemployment repetition and the ﬁrst unemployment are slightly higher in magnitude and
strength in the ordered Heckman procedure in Model 4. Overall this means that our standard ﬁxed effect models may have
underestimated the effects of scarring among men and women and that we should present our results with caution.5. Conclusion and discussion
The goal of this study was to investigate how wage setbacks following previous unemployment (i.e., unemployment scar-
ring) and its underlying mechanisms operate across gender in the Netherlands over the period 1985–2000. We argued that
the singular focus of existing literature on the scarring effects among men has left us with unanswered questions regarding
unemployment scarring by gender across speciﬁc social groups and in different economic contexts. From the human capital
theory, a central hypothesis was derived which predicted that unemployment scarring effects can be attributed to human
capital depreciation (i.e., limited work experience and out-dated skills and knowledge), which within the context of the
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from stigma theory, contextual hypotheses maintained that disparity in unemployment scarring should be more severe
among men and contingent on individual and economic level variation. Following Omori’s approach (1997), we argued that
if stigma drives unemployment then scarring effects should exacerbate in (tight) labor market situations and among speciﬁc
(disadvantaged) groups (e.g., age, parenthood, and ethnicity). By contrast, little or no contextual variation would indicate
that human capital depreciation effects dominate. Longitudinal data from the Netherlands Labor Supply Panel (OSA) over
the period 1985–2000 were used to test these hypotheses.
Using ﬁxed effects panel models our analyses reveal three central ﬁndings. A ﬁrst key ﬁnding was that unemployment
inﬂicts signiﬁcant wage losses among both men and women. We show that amongst women, unemployment scarring is
highest after the ﬁrst unemployment instance and less pronounced in the subsequent interruptions while for men scarring
varies over the course of unemployment repetitions and its duration. An explanation for the distinct pattern of scarring
among women may relate to the fact that women are more likely to change or switch into more ‘motherhood-friendly’ sec-
tors after the ﬁrst job interruption (Aisenbrey et al., 2009; Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002; Engelbrech, 1997). Consequently,
the costs of foregone skills and beneﬁts are highest after the ﬁrst job interruption and less pronounced in the subsequent
interruptions when women are more established in the ‘motherhood-friendly’ sectors. Interestingly, our results suggest that
scarring effects among women do not accumulate with the duration and repetition of unemployment while this is true
among men. Our results provide new clues about the gendered patterns of unemployment scarring and lend support to
recent approaches that call for the inclusion of women in the unemployment scarring analyses (Kalil and Ziol-Guest, 2008).
A second major ﬁnding is that the mechanisms underlying unemployment scarring vary by gender. Speciﬁcally, the weak-
er effects of unemployment scarring among women indicate that scarring mainly relates to the loss of occupation speciﬁc
knowledge and to the temporary character of women’s employment contracts. Re-employment wages of previously unem-
ployed men are also inﬂuenced by human capital depreciation. However, the stronger remaining scarring effects and the
wide contextual variation across men of different social groups and in different economic conditions suggest that scarring
effects among men are distributed through more channels.
Third and ﬁnally, we ﬁnd that discriminatory practices in hiring are more likely to occur (i) among older male workers, (ii)
during tight economic conditions or (iii) when originating from a country outside the Netherlands. An explanation may be
the fact that changing economic prospects alter the way in which employers make their hiring decisions. Increasing costs (of
retraining) of older workers and the ambiguity of the productivity of foreign workers may become a culprit to hire workers
that belong in one of these groups. This ﬁnding advances existing literature (Blanchard and Diamond, 1994; Omori, 1997), by
showing that scarring is conditional upon gender, age and ethnicity. At the same time, our ﬁndings lend support to recent
studies that ﬁnd substantial wage losses among (older) men who lost their jobs during the current economic crisis in the
United States (Farber, 2011).
What can we learn from the ﬁndings of this particular study? In this article, we have shown that it is fruitful to study the
effects of different unemployment dimensions simultaneously. The different dimensions of unemployment are measured in
different units of analyses and differ considerably between workers. This study shows that creating an unemployment index
is a useful tool to measure the ‘total’ effects of unemployment, and in doing so, calls into question the reported magnitude of
unemployment scarring which might have been underestimated in existing literature. Our results also suggest that loss of
speciﬁc skills that are tied to the previous ﬁrm or occupation lead to serious wage setbacks upon re-employment. This
implies that mismatching between former and current occupations may be crucial, yet it remains an overlooked area in
existing scarring research. Additional research is needed that reveals wage differences resulting from mismatching and dif-
ferences in workers’ search behavior. In addition, our study assumed that wage disadvantage related to ethnicity, was the
product of stigma. However, as shown by Moore (2010), lack of social networks and less effective search strategies may
be an alternative explanation for this wage gap that should be investigated with greater rigor in future research. Finally,
while our results suggest that unemployment scarring arises mainly through human capital depreciation among women,
it should be emphasized that for speciﬁc groups of women – such as for those who have attained a lower educational level
or those in the lower wage quintiles – stigma effects may play a role as well. More research is needed to explore these dif-
ferences and understand when human capital depreciation effects dominate the stigma effects and for which groups.
While our study advances current knowledge on unemployment scarring, it has been challenged by various drawbacks
that should be taken into account when interpreting our results. First, the share of panel attrition raised questions about
the validity of our estimations due to sample selectivity. We tested for non-randomness of sample selection by conducting
a two-step ordered probit Heckman procedure that tested for multiple response categories simultaneously. Although sample
selectivity was not generated at random, results from the sensitivity analyses showed that our ﬁxed effect estimates may
have underestimated the presented scarring effects among men and women. Second, given the nature of unemployment,
our sample of previously unemployed workers could be governed by unobserved characteristics, which inﬂuence both
the likelihood of experiencing unemployment and the level of wages upon re-employment. By differentiating between
the different reasons for unemployment, our study tried to account for characteristics that may reﬂect the quality of workers’
performance in the previous job and which, in turn, may lead to group differences in pay. Third, in addition to the
information at the time of interview, we used respondents’ retrospective information to reconstruct (un)employment
histories – information which may be hampered by recall errors. By using the reported unemployment as a count (in our
repetition variable) and duration data (the unemployment spell variable) we reconstructed unemployment histories
that are less sensitive to recall bias and have more acceptable levels of reliability (Pina-Sanchéz et al., 2012). However,
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Fig. 1A. The Kernel distribution of the rescaled (0/1) unemployment scale. Source: Data are from the OSA Supply Panels, 1985–2000, Netherlands.
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spells. Finally, the lower internal consistency of the unemployment index reﬂects the potential multidimensionality of
unemployment. While this was the only way to efﬁciently test the stigma related hypotheses, future studies following
our approach should be aware of this limitation.
Our ﬁndings also provide directions for future policies. For instance, in our study we show that the best way to prevent
unemployment scarring is to avoid falling into unemployment to begin with. In addition, our results in favor of stigma during
economic downturns ask for more attention from governments to design policies that protect workers from becoming
unemployed (i.e., through wage subsidies or employment programs) during economic crises. Such measures would not only
stimulate employers to hire sooner those once unemployed, but would also raise worker’s self-esteem and readiness to
accept a job (sooner).Acknowledgments
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See Fig. 1A, Tables 1A, 1B and 2A.Table 1A
Workers’ wage observations across the nine waves Source: Data are from the OSA supply panels, 1985–2000, Netherlands.
Waves
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Total
The # of wage observation
2 4059 281 206 95 64 33 22 6 4766
3 0 2206 154 126 49 35 17 7 2594
4 0 0 1305 90 88 30 15 4 1532
5 0 0 0 818 47 52 16 3 936
6 0 0 0 0 484 21 24 8 537
7 0 0 0 0 0 283 10 5 298
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 111 1 112
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 46
N 4059 2487 1665 1129 732 454 215 80 10,821
Table 1B
% Unemployed men and women aged between 15 and 54 years across the OSA panel and Bureau of Statistics Netherlands, 1985–2000 Source: Data are from the
OSA supply panels, 1985–2000, Netherlands and from the Statistics Netherlands <http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=71761ned&D1=
0,3,7&D2=0&D3=1,3,5,7,9,11,13,l&HDR=T&STB=G1,G2&VW=T>.
Years OSA % CBS %
1985 9.1 9.6
1986 7.3 8.6
1988 8.1 8.3
1990 5.6 6.9
1992 5.0 6.5
1994 6.1 8.5
1996 5.7 7.5
1998 3.7 5.1
2000 2.7 3.8
Table 2A
Means, standard deviations (SD) of workers aged between 21 and 54 years, by gender.
Male workers Female workers
Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent measure
Hourly wages (in Dutch guilders, absolute value) 17.65 7.15 14.72 8.08
Log of hourly wages (deﬂated) 2.48 0.30 2.28 0.33
Unemployment dimensions
Unemployment occurrence (T  1) 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.14
Unemployment duration, years (T  1) 0.02 0.24 0.08 0.48
First unemployment (T  1) 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31
2 previous unemployment spells 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17
3 previous unemployment spells 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.10
4+ previous unemployment spells 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.07
Unemployment index 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.11
Human Capital Measures
Elementary education 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.21
Lower intermediate education 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47
Higher intermediate secondary education 0.36 0.48 0.40 0.49
Vocational college 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.39
University degree 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.17
Tenure with previous employer (years) 2.59 1.44 2.28 1.31
Changed occupation 0.09 0.29 0.17 0.38
Changed industries 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12
Age (years) 37.7 8.88 36.1 9.17
Demographic, job, and macro variables
# Co-residing children 1.20 1.21 0.99 1.11
Marital status 0.77 0.41 0.74 0.43
Non-Dutch 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30
Working hours 37.5 4.09 25.5 11.3
Sector (= public) 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.43
Type of contract (1= permanent) 0.80 0.39 0.72 0.43
Unemployed due to ﬁrm closings 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.17
Unemployed due to own motivations 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.22
ISEI status 43.0 19.9 40.7 20.2
Macro variables
Unemployment rate 5.38 1.16 10.03 1.99
Number of observations 6798 4023
Number of workers 2821 1908
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